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In this paper, the authors examine the impact of 
reductions in barriers to migration on the consumption 
of rural households in China. The authors find 
that increased migration from rural villages leads to 
significant increases in consumption per capita, and 
that this effect is stronger for poorer households within 
villages. Household income per capita and non-durable 
consumption per capita both increase with out-
migration, and increase more for poorer households. 
The authors also establish a causal relationship between 
increased out-migration and investment in housing and 
This paper—a product of the Human Development and Public Services Team, Development Research Group— is part 
of a larger effort in the department to study the effects of rural-urban migration on household outcomes and investment 
decisions in migrant sending communities. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.
worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at jgiles@worldbank.org.  
durable goods assets, and these effects are also stronger 
for poorer households. The authors do not find robust 
evidence, however, to support a connection between 
increased migration and investment in productive 
activity. Instead, increased migration is associated with 
two significant changes for poorer households: increases 
both in the total labor supplied to productive activities 
and in the land per capita managed by the household. In 
examining the effect of migration, we pay considerable 
attention to developing and examining our identification 
strategy.Migrant Labor Markets and the Welfare of Rural Households in
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In developing countries, barriers to the movement of labor are a common institutional feature
which may contribute to geographic poverty traps. Whether maintained by formal institutions, by
cultural or linguistic diﬀerences across regions, or simply by high transaction costs associated with
ﬁnding migrant employment, constraints on the movement of labor within developing countries may
reinforce an ineﬃcient allocation of resources across regions and inﬂuence levels of investment in
poor areas.1 When barriers to cross-regional mobility of labor are removed, the resulting improved
eﬃciency of resource allocation may have important consequences for the well-being and living
standards of rural residents in the developing world.2 Remittances to household or family members
remaining in rural areas may supplement income earned locally and directly reduce exposure to
poverty. Migration may also have indirect eﬀects on welfare within the communities which migrants
are leaving, either in the form of increased wages with the depletion of the local labor force, or
through remittances from migrant employment that are invested in local production.3
While a growing body of research examines the impact of international migration on investment
and growth in migrant home countries, the impact of internal migration on home communities has
received relatively little recent attention.4 In some cases, researchers have documented correla-
tions between migration of a family member and household economic outcomes, however existing
research on the impact of internal migration generally lacks strategies that identify a robust causal
relationship between ability to migrate and outcomes in migrant home communities.
In this paper, we examine the impact of rural-urban migration on consumption in rural areas
of China. We ﬁrst extend a standard household model to include a migrant labor market, and
use this model to frame the possible mechanisms through which migration may aﬀect consumption
outcomes in migrant sending communities. By focussing on how the ability to migrate from a village
aﬀects household outcomes, we avoid endogeneity problems related to selection on unobservables
that typically complicate eﬀorts to analyze the eﬀects of household participation in migrant labor
markets on household level outcomes.5
1Jalan and Ravallion (2002) demonstrate that geographic poverty traps may have played a signiﬁcant role in
limiting the scope for household consumption growth in China’s poor areas during the 1980s.
2Yang (2008) ﬁnds that remittances to the Philippines from migrant family members are positively associated
with human capital investment and investment in more capital-intensive household enterprises.
3Woodruﬀ and Zenteño (2007) examine eﬀects of international migration from Mexico to the US on investment
levels in Mexico. They ﬁnd that attachment to migrant networks in the US is associated with higher levels of
investment and higher proﬁts of entrepreneurs in migrant home communities.
4An earlier literature explores the consumption-smoothing and household risk-management motivations for internal
migration (e.g., Rosenzweig and Stark, 1989).
5One must be concerned that unobserved characteristics facilitating household participation in the migrant labor
1We ﬁrst show that migration is positively associated with household consumption per capita,
and then examine the distributional eﬀects of migration within sending communities. Finally we
explore evidence on mechanisms through which migration raises consumption. We brieﬂyp r e v i e w
several results important for understanding how migration aﬀects well-being in China’s migrant-
sending communities.
First, expanded migration is associated with decreasing inequality within villages.6 Poorer
households within sending communities experience higher consumption growth when the cost of
migration falls. This ﬁnding is consistent with descriptive evidence from Benjamin et al (2005),
which suggests that remittance income is inequality-reducing within China’s rural villages. Increases
in out-migration also lead to increases in household income per capita, and poorer households supply
more labor to productive activities and experience more rapid income growth.
A second important ﬁnding relates to the impact of migration on investment in rural areas.
Increases in migration from rural China are associated with increased accumulation of housing
wealth and consumer durables, but we do not ﬁnd evidence of a signiﬁcant relationship between
migration and investment in productive assets. Evidence that migration might aﬀect investment in
agriculture and promote specialization among poorer households is mixed. While we ﬁnd no signif-
icant increases in investments related to agricultural production, poorer households are observed
to increase their land holdings per capita, and thus expand their scale of agricultural production.
Contrary to assertions in the China literature and evidence from the literature on Mexico-US migra-
tion, we do not ﬁnd any indication that rural-urban migration in China is associated with increases
in household investment in non-agricultural production.
Our empirical analysis pays careful attention to identifying the causal eﬀects of migration on
sending communities. To this end, we develop an instrumental variables (IV) strategy that takes
advantage of a reform in China’s residential registration (hukou) system making it easier for rural
migrants with national identiﬁcation cards (IDs) to legally reside in cities after 1988. National
IDs, which were ﬁrst available to urban residents in 1984, were not available in all rural counties
as of 1988. While allowing for the possibility that the timing of ID distribution may be related
to ﬁxed unobserved characteristics of villages, we show that the annual change in the share of the
village population working as migrants outside the village is a non-linear function of the time since
market may have an independent impact on consumption growth. For an extended discussion of this issue, and an
example of research that attempts to use a randomized lottery to avoid this form of selection bias, see McKenzie,
Gibson and Stillman (2006).
6McKenzie and Rapoport (2006) document a similar eﬀect of international migration on rural communities in
Mexico.
2residents of a county received IDs. After controlling for village-ﬁxed eﬀects and village-speciﬁc
trends, we identify the change in cost of migrating by exploiting diﬀerences in the timing of access
to IDs and the non-linearity in the relationship between the annual change in the village migrant
share and the time since IDs were distributed. To ensure that IDs were not distributed in response
to demand for ID cards, we show that the timing of ID card distribution is not related to exogenous
rainfall shocks aﬀecting both earnings in the local economy and migrant labor supply. We further
show that the timing of ID distribution is not systematically related to changes in variables proxying
for time-varying local policies, which may aﬀect the returns to labor or self-employment locally, or
to time-varying proxies reﬂecting local administrative capacity, which could be related to village
leader responsiveness to local demand for IDs.
To better identify diﬀerences in rate of migrant network growth across villages, we interact the
non-linear function of years since IDs were distributed with the variance of county rainfall. Under
the assumption that a village ﬁxed eﬀect controls for inherent riskiness of the local environment, the
interaction facilitates identiﬁcation by allowing for diﬀerences across villages in how IDs aﬀect the
growth of migrant networks. We also examine the plausibility of this expanded set of instruments.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we provide additional background on rural-urban
migration in China and introduce the RCRE Household and Village surveys used in the analyses.
Section 3 introduces the household model which provides a framework for the empirical methodology
discussed in section 4. In section 5, we present our results and a ﬁnal section concludes.
2B a c k g r o u n d
2.1 Rural-Urban Migration in China
Over the 1990s, rapid growth in the volume of rural migrants moving to urban areas signalled that
a dramatic change in the nature of China’s labor market was taking place. Estimates using the 1
percent sample from the 1990 and 2000 rounds of the Population Census and the 1995 one percent
population survey suggest that the inter-county migrant population grew from just over 20 million
in 1990 to 45 million in 1995 and 79 million by 2000 (Liang and Ma, 2004). Surveys conducted
by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) and the Ministry of Agriculture include more detailed
retrospective information on past short-term migration, and suggest even higher levels of labor
migration than those reported in the census (Cai, Park and Zhao, 2007).
Before labor mobility restrictions were relaxed, households in remote regions of rural China faced
3low returns to local economic activity, reinforcing geographic poverty traps (Jalan and Ravallion,
2002). A considerable body of descriptive evidence related to the growth of migration in China raises
the possibility that migrant opportunity may be an important mechanism for poverty reduction.
Studies of the impact of migration on migrant households suggest that migration is associated
with higher incomes (Taylor, Rozelle and de Brauw, 2003; Du, Park, and Wang, 2006), facilitates
risk-coping and risk-management (Giles, 2006; Giles and Yoo, 2007), and is associated with higher
levels of local investment in productive activities (Zhao, 2002).
The use of migrant networks and employment referral in urban areas are important dimensions
of China’s rural-urban migration experience. Rozelle et al (1999) emphasize that villages with
more migrants in 1988 experienced more rapid migration growth by 1995. Zhao (2003) shows that
number of early migrants from a village is correlated with the probability that an individual with
no prior migration experience will choose to participate in the migrant labor market. Meng (2000)
further suggests that variation in the size of migrant ﬂows to diﬀerent destinations can be partially
explained by the size of the existing migrant population in potential destinations.7
Descriptive evidence from a survey of migrants living in urban China conﬁrms the likely im-
portance of migrant networks for lowering the cost of ﬁnding employment. In a survey of rural
migrants conducted in ﬁve of China’s largest cities in late 2001, more than half of the migrants
reported that they secured employment before their ﬁrst migration experience, and more than 90
percent had an acquaintance from their home village living in the city when arriving (Table 1).8
Notably, before migrating over half of migrants surveyed had a member of their extended family
living in the city, and over 65 percent knew hometown acquaintances in the city other than family
members.9
7Referral through one’s social network is a common method of job search in both the developing and developed
world. Carrington, Detragiache, and Vishnawath (1996) explicitly show that in a model of migration, moving costs
can decline with the number of migrants over time, even if wage diﬀerentials narrow between source communities
and destinations. Survey-based evidence suggests that roughly 50 percent of new jobs in the US are found through
referrals facilitated by social networks (Montgomery, 1991). In a study of Mexican migrants in the US, Munshi
(2003) shows that having more migrants from one’s own village living in the same city increases the likelihood of
employment.
8We use the migrant sub-sample of the China Urban Labor Survey (CULS), which was conducted in late 2001 by
the Institute for Population and Labor Economics at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS-IPLE) working
in collaboration with local National Bureau of Statistics Survey Teams. Researchers from Michigan State University
and the University of Michigan collaborated in funding, designing, implementing and monitoring the survey. Using the
2000 Population Census as a guide, neighborhoods were selected using a proportional population sampling procedure.
Sample frames were then assembled from residents’ committee records of migrant households, and public security
bureau records of migrants living on construction sites. Very short-term migrants are unlikely to have been included
in the sample frame.
9Categories of acquaintance type shown in Table 1 are not exclusive because many migrants were preceded to
cities by both family members and other hometown acquaintances.
42.2 The RCRE Household Survey
The primary data sources used for our analyses are the village and household surveys conducted by
the Research Center for Rural Economy at China’s Ministry of Agriculture from 1986 through the
2002 survey year. We use data from 88 villages in eight provinces (Anhui, Jilin, Jiangsu, Henan,
Hunan, Shanxi, Sichuan and Zhejiang) that were surveyed over the 16-year period, with an average
of 6305 households surveyed per year. Depending on village size, between 40 and 120 households
were randomly surveyed in each village. Each village in the sample is in a diﬀerent county, so
county level policies aﬀect each village in this sample diﬀerently.
The RCRE household survey collected detailed household-level information on incomes and
expenditures, education, labor supply, asset ownership, land holdings, savings, formal and informal
access to credit, and remittances.10 In common with the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS)
Rural Household Survey, respondent households keep daily diaries of income and expenditure, and
a resident administrator living in the county seat visits with households once a month to collect
the diaries.
Our measure of consumption is the sum of annual expenditures on non-durable goods and an
imputed ﬂow of services from household durable goods and housing. In order to convert the stock
of durables into a ﬂow of consumption services, we assume that current and past investments in
housing are “consumed” over a 20-year period and that investments in durable goods are consumed
over a period of 7 years.11 We also annually “inﬂate” the value of the stock of housing and durables
to reﬂect the increase in prices of durable goods over the period. Finally, we deﬂate all income and
expenditure data to 1986 prices using the NBS rural consumer price index for each province.
There has been some debate over the representativeness of both the RCRE and NBS surveys, and
concern over diﬀerences between trends in poverty and inequality generated from these surveys.
These issues are reviewed extensively in Appendix B of Benjamin et al (2005), but it is worth
summarizing some of their ﬁndings here. First, when comparing cross sections of the RCRE and
NBS surveys with overlapping years from other cross sectional surveys that did not use a diary
method, it is apparent that high and low income households are somewhat under-represented.12
Poorer illiterate households are likely to be under-represented because enumerators ﬁnd it diﬃcult
10One shortcoming of the survey is the lack of individual-level information. However, we know the numbers of
working-age adults and dependents, as well as the gender composition of household members.
11Our approach to valuing consumption follows the suggestions of Chen and Ravallion (1996) for the NBS Rural
Household Survey, and is explained in detail in Appendix A of Benjamin et al (2005).
12The cross-sections used were the rural samples of the 1993, 1997 and 2000 China Health and Nutrition Survey
(CHNS) and a survey conducted in 2000 by the Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy (CCAP).
5to implement and monitor the diary-based survey, and refusal rates are likely to be high among
aﬄuent households who ﬁnd the diary reporting method a costly use of their time. Second, much
of the diﬀerence between levels and trends from the NBS and RCRE surveys can be explained by
diﬀerences in the valuation of home-produced grain and in the treatment of taxes and fees.
2.3 Trends in Migration, Consumption Growth and Poverty
One of the beneﬁts of the accompanying village survey are questions asked annually of village
leaders about the number of registered village residents working and living outside the village.
In our analysis, we consider all registered village residents who work outside the home county to
be migrants.13 Both the tremendous increase in migration from 1987 onward and heterogeneity
across villages are evident in Figure 1. In 1987 an average of 3 percent of working age laborers in
RCRE villages worked outside of their home counties, and this share rose steadily to 23 percent by
2003. Moreover, we observe considerable variability in the share of working age laborers working as
migrants. Whereas only a small share of legal residents are employed as migrants in some villages
by 2003, more than 50 percent of working age adults are employed outside their home county from
other villages.
The relationship between migration and consumption is of central concern for our analysis. The
linear ﬁt of the relationship between annual changes in share of the village workforce employed as
migrants (village migrant share) and growth in village average consumption in the RCRE data
suggest a positive relationship (Figure 2). The lowess ﬁt, however, suggests the presence of non-
linearities, particularly around zero. The prospect that out-migration may be driven by negative
shocks or return migration by positive shocks, which are correlated with movements in consumption,
should raise concern that migration and consumption are endogeneous.
Even if consumption grows with an increase in the number of residents earning incomes from
migrant employment, it is of particular policy interest to understand which residents within villages
are experiencing increases in consumption. Changes in the village poverty headcount are negatively
associated with the change in the number of out-migrants, suggesting that poverty declines with
increased out-migration (Figure 3). Nonlinearities in the bivariate relationship are again evident in
the lowess plot of the relationship. Whether obvious nonlinearities are related to the simultaneity
of shocks and increases in out-migration and poverty for some villages or to the simple fact that
13From follow up interviews with village leaders, it is apparent that registered residents living outside the county
are unlikely to be commuters and generally live and work outside the village for more than six months of the year.
6we have not controlled for other characteristics of villages, establishing a relationship between
migration and increased consumption of poorer households within villages requires an analytical
approach that allows us to eliminate bias due to both simultaneity and unobserved heterogeneity.
3M o d e l
In this section, we present a simple model to highlight the direct and indirect mechanisms through
which expanded migrant opportunity may aﬀect household consumption. The model illustrates
the relationship between the size of the migrant network, family income from earnings in local
and migrant labor markets, and the impact of migrant networks on credit constraints that may
inﬂuence a household’s ability to invest in self-employed productive activity. Essentially the model
highlights the potential eﬀects of the migrant network on permanent household income and thus
also on household consumption.
Assume that in each period t households may choose to invest in physical capital, Kt,u s e di n
agriculture or in non-agricultural household self-employment. Households earn income from some
or all of the following activities: agricultural production, non-agricultural self-employment, and
employment in local and migrant labor markets. Income from home production, indexed by h,
encompasses agricultural production and any other self-employment activities and is a function






,w h e r eθt is a multiplicative
productivity shock with a mean of one, where Ht is the current stock of human capital, and Lh
t is
the labor used in all self-employment activities. Similarly, household income from the local (l)a n d
migrant (m) labor markets is yl
t = wl(Ht,M jt)Ll
t and ym
t = wm(Ht,M jt)Lm
t , respectively. Above,
Ll
t and Lm
t denote the labor allocated to local and migrant employment, Mjt is a measure of the
size of the network of migrants working outside the village, and wl(Ht,M jt) and wm(Ht,M jt) are
the corresponding wages that can be earned in the local and migrant labor markets.14 We assume
that as Mjt increases, the cost of migrating falls. The household will thus accumulate physical
capital according to:






t + wm(Ht,M jt)Lm
t − ct (1)
14We consider wages earned in the migrant labor market as net returns to the household from migrant employment.
The migrant network may inﬂuence net income from migration by both lowering the cost of migration and by
facilitating matches to higher quality jobs. These eﬀects will be observationally indistinguishable, as they both raise
the net return to participating in the migrant labor market. The positive eﬀect of the village migrant share derives
from the importance of referral for job search (Montgomery, 1991) and speciﬁcally, on the role of networks for the
placement of migrants (Munshi, 2003).
7where ct is household consumption. We further restrict Kt,K t+1 ≥ 0, which allows households
to liquidate capital for consumption, but not to borrow beyond their capital stock for current
expenditures on consumption. We expect the size of the migrant network to be positively associated
with the net return to migrant employment, wm
t , by lowering the cost of participating in the
migrant market and improving the quality of job referrals for migrants.15 The migrant network
may have two general equilibrium eﬀects on wages in the local economy. First, as labor shifts into
migrant activities, the local non-agricultural labor supply decreases, putting upward pressure on
the local oﬀ-farm wage. Second, to the extent that migrant employment relaxes household credit
constraints, new investments in productive activities and housing construction may stimulate local
labor demand, also potentially increasing local wages.
Current utility is an additively separable concave function of consumption, ct,a n dt h el e i s u r e
of household members (lt =1−Lh
t −Ll
t −Lm








subject to (1) and the borrowing constraint, where δt is the subjective discount factor and E0 is
the expectations operator. Households are uncertain about future values of θt, w(·,·),a n dT.










+ wl(Ht,M jt)+wm(Ht,M jt)
´
(4)
where λt is the time-varying shadow value of physical capital that will be scaled by the discount













Because preferences are additively separable, current period decisions depend on past decisions
and expected future prices only through the shadow price of physical capital, λt. Further, after
15These eﬀects are observationally indistinguishable, as they both raise the net return to participating in the
migrant labor market.
8controlling for λt, the borrowing constraint only inﬂuences intertemporal decisions through the
intertemporal Euler equation and does not aﬀect intratemporal decisions.
Using equations (3) and (4), we can trace out the potential eﬀect of an increase in the village
migrant labor network on demand for leisure and consumption goods. First, income earned in both
the local and migrant labor markets increases, so the shadow price of physical assets, λt,f a l l s . T h e
wealth eﬀect eases credit constraints associated with accumulating assets for productive activities
(both agricultural and non-agricultural) and non-productive uses (e.g., investments in housing and
durable goods). In addition, household consumption may increase by relaxing a credit constraint
that led households to consume less and save more in each period as a precaution against potential
future production shocks.
The second eﬀect of an increase in size of the village migrant network operates through the
shadow price of household labor time. If leisure is a normal good, the net eﬀect on family labor
supply is indeterminate. A substitution eﬀect will lead families to supply more labor to productive
activities, but an income eﬀect may lead to a reduction in family labor supply. Our analyses below
focuses on the net eﬀect of migration on household consumption and income per capita, and also on
household investment in productive and non-productive assets. To provide further understanding
of the relationship between migration and household specialization, we will also examine impacts
of migration on farm size and household labor supply.
We further simplify the consumption demand function by recognizing that household produc-
tivity will be a function of time varying household endowments and other characteristics, Xit,t h a t
are related to wealth, skills, and human capital, which aﬀect the potential returns that family
members may earn both in the labor market and through household activities (e.g. Yang, 2004).
Furthermore, capital endowments and local labor market returns will be inﬂuenced by factors that
vary at the village level, Zjt, and we will consider unobservables, ui, related to risk preferences and
competencies of the household. We thus rewrite a reduced form of the demand function as:
c∗
it = c∗ (wit−1,θ t,Xit,Zjt,M jt,u i) (6)
where consumption of household i in period t is a function of the determinants of household income.
The determinants include household wealth at the end of the previous period, wit−1,w h i c hi sac o m -
bination of the value of productive assets and ﬁnancial wealth aﬀecting the shadow price of physical
capital, productivity shocks, household endowments and characteristics, village characteristics, the
9size of the migrant network, and household unobservables, ui.
4 Empirical Methodology
4.1 Estimating the Eﬀect of Migration on Consumption
The theoretical framework above suggests the following empirical speciﬁcation for household con-
sumption, cit:
cit = β1wit−1 + β2Mjt + β3(wit−1 · Mjt)+X0
itα + Z0
jtγ + ui + vj + tj + εijt (7)
The logarithm of per capita household consumption in period t will be a function of measured
household physical and ﬁnancial wealth per capita at the end of period t − 1, wit−1,a n dt h er e l -
ative size of the migrant labor force from village j, Mjt. Household characteristics, Xit, inﬂuence
consumption through endowments, such as human capital, which aﬀect household permanent in-
come, and through demographic characteristics which inﬂuence consumption preferences. Since
ability to participate in or beneﬁt from the migrant labor market may aﬀect households diﬀerently
depending on their wealth level, we are also explicitly interested in the interaction, wit−1 · Mjt.
We include time-varying village variables to pick up heterogeneity across villages in policies and
economic conditions, Zjt,t h a tm a yi n ﬂuence consumption through eﬀects on productivity. We use
village dummy variables, vj, to control for other observable and unobservable ﬁxed characteristics
of villages that may aﬀect consumption, such as location, connections to oﬀ-farm markets and
proximity to employers. Additionally, village speciﬁc trends, tj, related to underlying endowments
and initial conditions in the village, may further aﬀect consumption. At the household level, we
also expect that ﬁxed unobservables, ui, will be related to consumption preferences and to the ease
with which the household participates in the migrant labor market.
Household wealth is typically diﬃcult to measure accurately because the valuation of productive
asset stocks depends upon assumptions about depreciation and the useful life of assets, and the
value of ﬁnancial assets is frequently under-reported in household surveys. Moreover, access to
transfers and informal loans from non-resident family members and friends will have an impact on
expected lifetime wealth and current consumption, but the ability to receive transfers and loans
will be unobservable to the econometrician. To proxy for lagged household wealth in equation (7),
we use lagged household consumption, implicitly assuming that lagged consumption is strongly
10correlated with perceptions of lifetime wealth at the start of period t.16 Thus, we rewrite equation
(7) as:
cit = β1cit−1 + β2Mjt + β3(cit−1 · Mjt)+X0
itα + Z0
jtγ + ui + vj + tj +  it (8)
To control for ﬁxed eﬀects at the household and village level, we ﬁrst-diﬀerence equation (8). We
further add province-year interactions, p ⊗ t, to control for the eﬀects of province-wide macroeco-
nomic shocks, and obtain:
∆cit = β1∆cit−1 + β2∆Mjt + β3∆(cit−1 · Mjt)+∆X0
itα + ∆Z0
jtγ + dj + p ⊗ t+∆ it (9)
Diﬀerencing the village-speciﬁc trend leaves us with a vector of village dummy variables, dj,t h a t
control for diﬀerences in consumption growth trends across villages.
We will be most interested in coeﬃcients β2 and β3, which capture the eﬀect of the migrant
labor market on consumption at diﬀerent lagged consumption levels. For any given level of lagged
consumption, the marginal eﬀect of migration on present consumption is η = β2 + β3cit−1.I fo u t -
migration has a positive eﬀect on household per capita consumption, we expect β2 to be positive,
and the sign of β3 will indicate which households within the village experience faster consumption
growth as the size of the migrant network expands. If β3 is positive, wealthier households have
faster consumption growth, ceteris paribus,w h e r e a si fβ3 is negative, poorer households within
villages experience faster consumption growth with migration.
4.2 Endogeneity Concerns
The ﬁrst three terms in equation (9), ∆cit−1, ∆Mjt, and ∆(cit−1 · Mjt) suﬀer from well known
endogeneity problems. Errors in the measurement of lagged log consumption, cit−1,w i l lb ep r e s e n t
in both the dependent variable (∆cit = cit − cit−1)a n dar e g r e s s o r( ∆cit−1 = cit−1 − cit−2), and
these will be correlated with the diﬀerenced error term, ∆ it. We instrument ∆cit−1 with cit−3
under the assumption that cit−3 is correlated with ∆cit−1 but not ∆ it. We then use an additional
lag, cit−4, to provide for over-identiﬁcation.17
Change in our proxy for the cost of migration, the village migrant share, ∆Mjt, is endogenous as
16This approach is common in empirical estimation of dynamic models of consumption decisions. See Banks,
Brugiavinni and Blundell (2001) for another example and additional references.
17Anderson and Hsiao (1982) actually suggest that the t−2 lag might be suﬃcient, but since shocks to consumption
may have long memory in some villages, we use the t − 3 lag. In a GMM framework, Arellano and Bond (1991)
showed that all available lags back to period 1 may be used. Wooldridge (2002) cautions, however, that if correlation
between the regressor ∆cit−1 and distant lags are weak, then adding large numbers of additional weak instruments
may introduce bias.
11it reﬂects factors aﬀecting both change in demand for migrant labor and change in labor supply de-
cisions of migrants and potential migrants. Disruptions to the local economy, for example, decrease
household consumption per capita while increasing the relative return to migrant employment in
more distant locations, potentially leading to an observed negative relationship between increases
in migration and consumption growth. To identify the eﬀect of migration on consumption, it is
necessary to ﬁnd an instrument that is correlated with the share of village residents working as
migrants, but otherwise unrelated to factors aﬀecting growth or negative shocks experienced by the
village.
To instrument for migration, we make use of two policy changes that, working together, aﬀect
the strength of migrant networks outside home counties but are plausibly unrelated to average
village consumption growth. First, a new national ID card (shenfen zheng) was introduced in 1984.
While urban residents received IDs in 1984, residents of most rural counties did not receive them
immediately. In 1988, a reform of the residential registration system made it easier for migrants to
gain legal temporary residence in cities, but a national ID card was necessary to obtain a temporary
residence permit (zanzu zheng) (Mallee, 1995). While some counties made national IDs available to
rural residents as early as 1984, others distributed them in 1988, and still others did not issue IDs
until several years later. The RCRE follow-up survey asked local oﬃcials when IDs had actually
been issued to rural residents of the county. In our sample, 41 of the 88 counties issued ID cards in
1988, but cards were issued as early as 1984 in three counties and as late as 1997 in one county. It is
important to note that IDs were not necessary for migration, and large numbers of migrants live in
cities without legal temporary residence cards. However, migrants with temporary residence cards
have a more secure position in the destination community, hold better jobs, and thus plausibly make
up part of a longer-term migrant network in migrant destinations.18 Thus, ID distribution had two
eﬀects after the 1988 residential registration (hukou) reform. First, the costs of migrating to a
city should fall after IDs became available. Second, if the quality of the potential migrant network
improves with the years since IDs are available, then the costs of ﬁnding migrant employment
should continue to fall over time.19
18Migrants without temporary residents permits could be subject to detention, ﬁnes and repatriation to their rural
homes. While relatively rare during most of the period after 1988, this practice took place in some cities where
migrants were viewed as competing with local displaced workers during the economic retrenchment that followed
state sector restructuring in the late 1990s (Solinger, 1999).
19Our identiﬁcation strategy makes no attempt to explicitly identify the direct eﬀect of the migrant network, as
in Munshi (2003). Our purpose in using a function of years-since-IDs-issued is to identify the net eﬀect of migration
under the plausible assumption that networks of earlier migrants with legal residence may contribute to reducing the
cost of migration.
12As a result, the relative size of the migrant network should be a function of both whether or not
cards have been issued and the time since cards have been issued in the village. Given that the size
of the potential network has an upper bound, we expect years-since-IDs-issued to have a non-linear
relationship with the share of the village labor force working as migrants, and growth in the size
of this potential migrant network should decline after initially increasing with distribution of IDs.
In Figure 4, we show a lowess plot of the relationship between years since IDs were distributed and
the change in the share of village residents working as migrants from year t − 1 to t. Immediately
after IDs are distributed, the share of the village labor force working as migrants grows sharply,
and then slows after seven years. This pattern suggests non-linearity in the relationship between ID
distribution and new participants in the village migrant labor force. We thus specify our instrument
as a dummy variable indicating that IDs had been issued interacted with years since issue, and
then experiment with quadratic, cubic and quartic functions of years-since-IDs were issued. We
settle on the quartic function for our instruments because we ﬁnd it ﬁts the pattern of expanding
village migrant share better than the quadratic or the cubic functions.20
In order to exploit additional heterogeneity across villages in how the timing of ID card distri-
bution aﬀects the growth of migrant networks, we interact the quartic with the variance of historic
village rainfall during important periods of the crop calendar.21 Whether or not it is appropriate
to interact the years-since-IDs were issued with the rainfall variance merits careful consideration.
We expect that in villages with low rainfall variance, households would be less likely to respond
to ID cards with migration and IDs will have less impact on growth of the migrant network from
these villages. The interaction terms are valid instruments under the assumption that a village
ﬁxed eﬀect controls for ﬁxed diﬀerences across villages in the riskiness of the local environment,
and that the rainfall variance interactions pick up diﬀerences in the rate of growth in networks
across villages subsequent to distribution of IDs.
Since the diﬀerenced interaction term in equation (9), ∆(cit−1 · Mjt) is comprised of two en-
dogenous regressors, we also include instruments for this term. We identify it using interactions
between consumption in periods t−3 and t−4 and the eight instruments for the size of the migrant
20Results in the paper are robust to using the quadratic or cubic functions of years-since-IDs were issued.
21Giles and Yoo (2007) analyze the crop calendar and diﬀerent combinations of monthly rainfall shocks, and
demonstrate that for the villages and households of Anhui, Jiangsu, Henan and Shanxi, negative shocks between July
and November are the strongest predictor of negative shocks to agricultural production during the following year. We
have similarly examined the relationship between rainfall and the crop calendar for Hunan, Sichuan and Zhejiang, and
found the shock from April to November to be more important, which makes some sense due to the longer growing
season in these areas. Jilin’s crop calendar is more similar to Henan and Shanxi, so we use the July-November period
for Jilin.
13network, Mjt.T h ec o e ﬃcient on this term will be of interest for identifying the impact of migration
at diﬀerent levels of the wealth distribution within villages.
Finally, the regressors included in ∆Xit and ∆Zjt might not be strictly exogenous. For example,
income shocks that aﬀect household consumption decisions may also have an impact on household
composition, land characteristics or village policy. Below, we ﬁrst estimate models that exclude
∆Xit and ∆Zjt, then successively add village and household regressors, treating them as exogenous
and then as pre-determined but not strictly exogenous. For models in which regressors are treated
as pre-determined, we use a standard panel data approach to control for possible endogeneity
bias. Speciﬁcally, we instrument ﬁrst-diﬀerenced predetermined variables with their t − 2 lagged
levels [Xit−2,Zjt−2] in speciﬁcations which include these regressors. Xit−2 and Zjt−2 will be valid
instruments as long as they are correlated with ∆Xit and ∆Zjt, but uncorrelated with any time-
varying household unobservables included in the diﬀerenced error term, ∆ it.22
4.3 Understanding the Years-Since-IDs Instrument
ID distribution was the responsibility of county level oﬃces of the Ministry of Civil Aﬀairs, and these
are distinctly separate from the Ministries of Agriculture and Finance which set policies aﬀecting
land, credit, taxation and poverty alleviation. Therefore it is plausible that ID distribution is
not systematically related to unobservable policy decisions that have a direct eﬀect on household
consumption. Still, a function of the years since IDs were issued is not an ideal strategy for
identifying village out-migration. Ideally, a policy would exist that was randomly implemented,
aﬀecting the ability to migrate from some counties but not others. As the diﬀerential timing of
ID card distribution was not necessarily random, we must be concerned that counties with speciﬁc
characteristics or that followed speciﬁc policies were singled out to receive ID cards earlier than
other counties, or that features of counties receiving IDs earlier are systematically correlated with
other policies aﬀecting consumption growth. These counties, one might argue, were “allowed” to
build up migrant networks faster than others.
To evaluate the plausibility of using years-since-ID-distribution as an instrument, we ﬁrst cat-
egorize villages as receiving cards prior to 1988, in 1988, or after 1988, and look for signiﬁcant
diﬀerences in observable average village characteristics measured in 1988 (Table 2). In the third
row of each characteristic, we report the p-value of t-tests of the equality of the mean within each
22Wooldridge (2002) provides a helpful introduction to standard panel data approaches to control for endogeneity
bias of regressors that are predetermined but not strictly exogenous.
14category with the combined mean of the other two categories. Several signiﬁcant diﬀerences ap-
pear between villages that were early and late recipients of IDs, and we observe a general pattern
consistent with the likelihood that early recipients of IDs were less remote, had smaller households,
were less concentrated in agriculture and had higher consumption levels. In the fourth line for
each item of Table 2, we report p-values of t-tests for the equality of means across categories after
partialing out province ﬁxed eﬀects and geographic dummies for hilly or mountainous locations.
After controlling for these variables, we observe fewer diﬀerences across villages in 1988 that are
systematically related to timing of ID availability. Still, the existing diﬀerences suggest that we
must control for these and other unobserved diﬀerences across villages by including village ﬁxed ef-
fects in all our estimated models, and identifying the eﬀect of migrant networks oﬀ of nonlinearities
in the years since ID cards were distributed.
Even after controlling for village location with village ﬁxed eﬀects, one might be concerned that
the timing of ID card receipt was endogenous. Speciﬁcally, the recognition that rural residents were
migrating may have led county oﬃc i a l st oi s s u eI D si nr e s p o n s et oas h a r pr i s ei nm i g r a t i o n . I f
true, issuing IDs would have little to do with new migration, but might be correlated with existing
migrant ﬂows. The lowess plot of change in village migrant share versus years-since-IDs were issued
indicates that out-migration accelerates immediately after or as IDs are issued and then slows by
10 years after issue (Figure 4). The pattern also suggests non-linearity in the relationship between
the changes in the size of the village migrant outﬂow and the years since ID cards were issued.23
Although Figure 4 appears to demonstrate a pattern consistent with ID cards facilitating in-
creased migration, a common time trend could be driving the observed relationship between receipt
of IDs and change in out-migration. To address this possibility, we separate the sample into vil-
lages receiving IDs in 1988 or earlier and those receiving IDs after 1988, and plot the relationship
between change in migration and ID receipt across these two groups of villages (Figure 5). While
the estimated rate of increase in migration with ID distribution is not as steep for villages that
were later recipients, this diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant, leading us to conclude that the
apparent impact of ID distribution is not simply the result of a common trend.
In order to motivate allowing the eﬀects of ID distribution to vary with riskiness of the local
economy, we next use the lowess estimator to plot changes in the number of migrants in each village
against years-since-IDs were issued by terciles of rainfall variance (Figure 6). For villages in the ﬁrst
23One might be concerned that the pattern shown in Figure 4 is driven exclusively by the 41 villages receiving IDs
in 1988, and so we plotted this relationship excluding villages receiving IDs in 1988 and observed no diﬀerence in the
bivariate relationship.
15and second tercile, with a lower rainfall variance, we ﬁnd that migrant networks take longer to build
up after the introduction of ID cards; the slope of the relationship between changes in migration and
years-since-IDs is not as steep as for the third tercile, for which the village migrant network responds
rapidly after the introduction of ID cards. These patterns suggest that, once we have controlled
directly for riskiness of the local economy through a ﬁxed eﬀect, then interactions of rainfall variance
with the quartic in years since IDs were issued will allow us to pick up additional diﬀerences across
villages in the eﬀect of the existing village migrant network on subsequent migration.
The observed lowess plots in Figures 4 through 6 still do not rule out the possibility that local
village level eﬀects, such as shocks to the village economy, may aﬀect both household incentives
to migrate and ID distribution decisions. To directly address this possibility, we estimate a dis-
crete time duration model for ID distribution and test whether exogenous rainfall shocks, which
make migration more attractive, are also signiﬁcantly related to the distribution of IDs. Rainfall
shocks aﬀect local agricultural productivity and returns to labor in both local agricultural and
non-agricultural sectors. Large shocks will be positively associated with household decisions to
supply labor to the migrant labor market, and if these decisions drive distribution of IDs, then
we should observe an impact of rainfall shocks on ID distribution.24 To implement this test, we
estimate a logit hazard model using village level data in which the dependent variable is equal to
one in the year that IDs are distributed and zero prior to distribution. After IDs are distributed,
the village drops from the sample for subsequent years. Regressors include province dummies and
rainfall shocks for year t − 1 and t − 2 (Appendix Table A.1). We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant relationship
between exogenous shocks to the local economy and distribution of IDs, and thus we have some
conﬁdence that household desire to supply labor to migrant destinations is not driving the timing
of ID distribution.25
24Note that in this test we use the actual value of lagged shocks, rather than variance, which is a proxy for risk.
In a Appendix, Giles and Yoo (2007) show the t − 1 July-November rainfall shock, calculated as either an absolute
or squared deviation from mean, is systematically related to negative shocks to earnings from the winter wheat crop
h a r v e s t e di ny e a rt. They also show that this shock is strongly related to increased participation in migrant labor
markets, increases in the number of days in migrant employment and increased migrant remittances.
25Neither the t − 1 nor t − 2 rainfall shocks have a statistically signiﬁcant independent eﬀect on ID distribution.
Moreover, the p-value on a chi-square statistic of the joint signiﬁcance of rainfall shocks for years t − 1 and t − 2 is
0.26.
165R e s u l t s
5.1 The First-Stage
Before estimating equation (9), we ﬁrst establish that our instruments, period t − 2 values of a
polynomial function of the years since ID cards were issued and interactions with rainfall variance,
are signiﬁcantly related to the change, from period t − 1 to t, in the share of village residents
working as migrants. We estimate the relationship with only province-year and village dummies
included along with years-since IDs were issued speciﬁed as a quadratic, cubic, and quartic function
(Table 3, columns 1 through 3) and then include interactions with the rainfall variance (columns
4 through 6). Each potential speciﬁcation suggests a strong relationship between our candidate
instruments and the change in the size of the village migrant network. We favor the quartic function
and interactions with rainfall variance for two reasons. First, this instrument set (with the quartic)
allows for additional ﬂexibility in the functional form of the eﬀects of ID card distribution on the
migrant network.26 Second, the partial R2 increases signiﬁcantly from the quadratic to the quartic,
thus reducing the potential for bias in instrumental variables regression.27
In columns 7 and 8 we add controls for village and household level economic conditions that
vary over time and may be related to both consumption growth and migration. Anticipating
models in which we control for endogenous changes in village or household variables, we sequentially
add village controls in column 7 and household controls in column 8, both lagged two periods.
At the village level, we include the size of the village labor force to control for local returns to
labor, the cultivable share of village land, total village land, and the share of land planted in
orchards, which control for village land endowment and specialization in high value crops, and
the share of village assets controlled by collectives to control for the returns to capital outside
agriculture as well as local government involvement in the economy. At the household level, we
include the number of working age members of the household, the share of household members that
are male and female, respectively, land per capita, and the average education level of adults in the
household. These variables control for the household labor, physical capital, and human capital
endowments, respectively. In both cases, the relationship between the migrant network variable
and the instruments for migration remain strong, and the F-statistic suggests that the complete
26The quartic was ﬁrst favored in studies of empirical age earnings proﬁl e sa sf a rl e s sr e s t r i c t i v et h a nt h et y p i c a l
second order polynomial in age (Murphy and Welch, 1990).
27Since the bias in instrumental variables estimation is inversely proportional to the partial R
2,ah i g h e rp a r t i a l
R
2 also implies lower bias so long as each additional instrument is strongly correlated with the endogenous variable.
17set of instruments has suﬃcient power to ease concerns over weak instrument bias.
5.2 The Timing of ID Distribution and Changes in Village Policy
and Administrative Capacity
Results shown in Table 3 suggest that the timing of ID distribution is signiﬁcantly related to changes
in the share of village residents working as migrants. Although policies likely to aﬀect consumption
were set by local bureaus of the Ministries of Agriculture and Finance rather than the Ministry
of Civil Aﬀairs, one might still be concerned that the set of instruments is systematically related
to changes in other time-varying village level policies or administrative capabilities. In turn, these
policies may aﬀect both changes in migration and per capita consumption. For example, village
leaders have considerable control over implementation of grain procurement policy and land use by
village residents, so it is important to know whether or not changes in variables reﬂecting policy
changes are systematically related to the timing of ID distribution. If a systematic relationship
exists, the instruments may proxy for factors other than migration that inﬂuence consumption
growth within the village. A further concern is that changes in village administrative capacity
might be systematically related to timing of ID distribution within the county, even though IDs
became available at the county level and each county typically includes hundreds of villages.
To ensure that the instruments are not correlated with variables reﬂecting other policy changes
that might aﬀect consumption, we construct proxy variables for changes in time-varying village
policy and administrative capacity, ∆VP jt, and regress them on period t − 3 and t − 4 log con-
sumption per capita, which are our instruments for the change in lagged log consumption in our
main models, the quartic in years since IDs (IDjt−2), and interactions with village rainfall variance
(RVj), period t − 2 lagged household and village regressors, village ﬁxed eﬀects and province-year
ﬁxed eﬀects:










jt−2α9 + vj + p ⊗ tt + eijt
In Table 4, we report F-tests on the quartic in years-since IDs were issued and interactions in
speciﬁcations that both exclude household and village characteristics other than lagged consumption
per capita (column 1) and the full reduced form which includes vectors of t − 2 household and
18village level characteristics (column 2). We ﬁrst examine the relationship between our instruments
and evidence on changes in implementation of grain policy. Rural farm households faced a grain
quota that was eﬀectively a tax, as households were required to provide grain to the government
at below market price.28 Households providing a relatively large share of their grain production
to the government at quota price were more likely to be producing grain simply to meet quota
requirements. For such households, production of grain crops to meet the quota may reﬂect a
constraint on household production decisions that also aﬀects income and consumption. In row 1,
we show that the change in the share of grain sold at the quota price has no systematic relationship
with the instruments, and so we conclude that changes in quota policy are not confounded with
the timing of ID distribution and also driving consumption growth.
We next test whether changes in indicators of land tenure security are systematically related to
the instruments. While farmers nominally had ﬁfteen and then thirty year leases over the period
from 1986 to 2003, the leases were treated as policy, and village leaders often reallocated land more
frequently for a variety of reasons.29 The share of land in the village which households rent in
or out reﬂects perceptions of long-term land tenure security. Land rental will not occur in areas
where a rental transaction signals that a household no longer needs its land, and may thus ﬁnd that
the land it rents out is expropriated. Alternatively, some villages place excessive administrative
procedures and conditions on rental transactions. We do not observe any sign of a statistically
signiﬁcant relationship between changes in land rental behavior of households and the timing of
ID card distribution, suggesting that our instruments are not systematically related to changes in
village policies toward land which also aﬀect local investment or labor supply decisions, nor any
subsequent consumption or income growth.
Next, we examine the relationship between changes in the weighted average local tax rate paid
by households and the instruments. During the study period, villages charged several diﬀerent
administrative fees to support investment in local public goods and to cover village administrative
costs. The weighted average village tax rate is a useful indicator of village administrative capacity.
If village administrative capacity is related to timing of ID distribution, as village leaders lobby
higher levels of government for IDs, this capacity could aﬀect motives for migration and observed
consumption growth. We ﬁnd that the weighted average village tax rate is not systematically
28In the surveyed villages, as well as throughout rural China, the quota was phased out between 2001 and 2004.
29Local variation in land policy and in land tenure security in rural China has been documented by numerous
scholars. A helpful selection of useful papers discussing the land tenure system, its consequences and village level
policy include Kung (1995); Benjamin and Brandt (2002); Jacoby, Li, and Rozelle (2002); Brandt, Rozelle and Turner
(2004); and Deininger and Jin (2005).
19related to the timing of ID distribution (Table 4, row 4).
Finally, we examine whether changes in the log value of assets managed by the village collective
are associated with the time since IDs were issued. Villages operating enterprises or otherwise
managing village productive assets may diﬀer systematically in their implementation of adminis-
trative policy and in the timing of ID distribution. A major divestment of assets by the village
with bankruptcy of an enterprise, for example, might lead to an increase in village unemployment
and decision by a local leader to facilitate migration by distributing IDs. Again, after controlling
for other village characteristics, we ﬁnd no evidence that ID distribution is systematically related
to changes in village management of local enterprises and other production assets (Table 4, row 5).
5.3 The Eﬀect of Migration on Household Consumption
To begin our examination of the eﬀects of migration on consumption, we estimate OLS models of
the eﬀects of migration on consumption in both levels and ﬁrst-diﬀerences. As one might expect
if unobserved local shocks are an important factor driving initial migration decisions, the coeﬃ-
cient on migration is negative and insigniﬁcant in the OLS levels model (Appendix Table A.2).
When estimated in ﬁrst diﬀerences, we observe the negative coeﬃcient on the diﬀerenced lagged
dependent variable which is consistent with measurement error in consumption for period t − 1
that is present in both dependent variable ∆cit and with the opposite sign in the lagged dependent
variable, ∆cit−1. We therefore focus our analyses on IV-GMM models in which we control for
simultaneity bias and other unobservables potentially related to our measure of migration and for
mechanical forms of bias created by the lagged dependent variable. The weighting matrix used in
the GMM estimator accounts for arbitrary heteroscedasticity and intracluster correlation, and it
is asymptotically eﬃcient in the presence of heteroscedasticity (Wooldridge, 2002; Baum, Schaﬀer,
and Stillman, 2003).
We ﬁrst estimate equation (9) removing unobservables at the household and village level through
diﬀerencing, capturing village speciﬁc time trends with village dummy variables, and controlling
for province-wide shocks with a set of province-year dummy variables (Table 5). We begin by
restricting β3 to zero, implying that the coeﬃcient β2 can be interpreted as the average eﬀect
of migration on the logarithm of consumption over all households within a village. We initially
observe signiﬁcant persistence in household consumption, and ﬁnd that increasing out-migration
has a positive eﬀect on consumption that is signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. An over-identiﬁcation
test suggests that there is no statistical evidence against the validity of our instruments. In this
20speciﬁcation, the Cragg-Donald F-Statistic indicates that the bias in the IV coeﬃcient is less than
ﬁve percent of the bias in OLS.30 We next add village and household controls, treating them ﬁrst as
exogenous (column 2) and then as predetermined (column 3), using t−2 levels of the household and
village controls as instruments. Whereas the coeﬃcient estimate ˆ β2 remains positive, its magnitude
decreases and is no longer statistically signiﬁcant in both columns.
We next relax the constraint that β3 =0 , and allow the eﬀect of migration on consumption to
diﬀer with lagged household consumption (Table 5, columns 4 through 6). The estimated coeﬃcient
ˆ β2 remains positive, and the estimated coeﬃcient ˆ β3 is negative and statistically signiﬁcant. The
negative sign on the diﬀerenced interaction term suggests that increased access to migrant labor
markets beneﬁts poorer households within the village relative to well-oﬀ households. At the mean
level of consumption in the data set for any speciﬁc year, the estimates imply that migration has a
positive eﬀect on consumption, and that the eﬀect is larger for poorer households. The signiﬁcance
and relative magnitude of the coeﬃcient estimates of interest do not change as diﬀerenced household
and village controls are added (column 5), nor when they are treated as pre-determined (column
6). The potential endogeneity of changes to the village population and contemporaneous shocks is
evident as the estimated coeﬃcient on the change in the village labor force is close to zero when
treated as exogenous, but positive and signiﬁcant when treated as pre-determined. The eﬀect of
contemporaneous shocks from either the local economy or migrant destinations is more apparent
when examining changes in household demographic characteristics. When household composition
is treated as exogenous, we observe signiﬁcant negative coeﬃcients on change in number of working
age laborers in the household. This negative coeﬃcient estimate suggests that adults moving into
the household may be associated with shocks experienced by these individuals in the previous
period, and then lead to apparent declines in household consumption per capita. Once household
size and demographic characteristics are treated as pre-determined but not strictly exogenous, we
no longer observe signiﬁcant negative eﬀects of the number of laborers on consumption per capita.31
In order to examine the eﬀects of migration on consumption at diﬀerent points in the consump-
tion distribution within villages we plot the predicted eﬀect of a 10 percent increase in the village
30Stock and Yogo (2005) compute critical values of the Cragg-Donald F-Statistic when there are two and three
endogenous regressors. In all of the models presented in this paper, we reject the hypothesis that the bias in IV
coeﬃcients is larger than 10 percent of the bias in OLS, and in most models we can reject the hypothesis that the
bias is larger than 5 percent of the bias in OLS. To ensure that our estimates do not suﬀer from weak instrument
bias, we follow Stock and Yogo’s approach and re-estimated each model using Nagar’s (1959) bias corrected two stage
least squares, and found that our coeﬃcient estimates did not diﬀer (results available upon request).
31Jalan and Ravallion (1999) ﬁrst noted the potential importance of treating household composition as endogenous
when examining consumption smoothing in rural China.
21migrant share from 1995 levels on consumption against prior year consumption (Figure 7). We
calculate both the short-term eﬀects (Panel A) and the long-term eﬀects (Panel B), using the delta
method to compute standard errors and 95 percent conﬁdence intervals.32 For values of consump-
tion less than median per capita consumption in 1995, the point estimate for the eﬀect of migration
is positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. Therefore we can be conﬁdent that
migration is positively associated with consumption growth among those households.
At the median level of per capita consumption in 1995, the coeﬃcient estimates imply that if
the migrant share of the village labor force increases by 10 percent, in the next period per capita
consumption will increase by slightly more than 0.5 percent, ceteris paribus. The long term increase
in consumption associated with the same one-time increase in migration is quite a bit higher, at 1.2
percent. Clearly, migration was a signiﬁcant factor in increasing living standards in rural China.
Finally, it is worth noting that although estimates are not statistically signiﬁcant for the whole
consumption distribution, point estimates are positive for nearly the entire distribution, so we can
be reasonably conﬁdent that migration opportunity had a positive eﬀect on consumption for most
households.
5.3.1 Speciﬁcation Issues
Although our main result suggests that increasing migration has a larger impact on poor households
than richer ones, it is possible that the interaction term that which yields this ﬁnding is actually
proxying for nonlinearities in the eﬀect of past shocks on current consumption growth. Such
nonlinearities might arise, for example, in the presence of credit constraints. If the interaction term
is proxying for nonlinear eﬀects of past shocks and we control for them, then the negative coeﬃcient
on the interaction term should disappear.
To examine whether our results are robust to such nonlinearities, we re-estimate equation (9)
including ∆(c2
it−1) as a regressor. We instrument this term with t − 3 and t − 4 values of log
consumption squared and include it in a new estimate of equation (9) (Table 6). Whether we
estimate the basic model (column 1) or the full model (column 2), we ﬁnd virtually no change in
the coeﬃcients of interest, β2 and β3. We thus conclude that nonlinearities related to past shocks
are not behind our ﬁnding that migration raises consumption of poorer households more than well
oﬀ households. Therefore nonlinearities are not driving the ﬁndings in Table 5.
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j is the village migrant share in village j in 1995.
22A second speciﬁcation issue arises from descriptive studies examining the relationship between
migration and poverty in rural China. For example, Du, Park and Wang (2005) examine correlations
between household participation in migrant employment and poverty status, and ﬁnd that the
probability of migration ﬁrst increases with household income, and then begins to decrease. We
are concernced with the general equilibrium eﬀects of village migration on household consumption,
and it is not necessary for a household to directly participate in the migrant market to beneﬁtf r o m
increased migration. Nevertheless, an inverted-U relationship between migration and income may
be present and masked by the assumption of a linear relationship in equation (9). If so, migration
should have less eﬀect on household consumption at low levels, increase and peak, and ﬁnally
decrease for higher levels of consumption. We examine this possibility by including the square of
the lagged consumption level interacted with the migration variable, and ﬁnd some evidence of a
quadratic relationship (Table 6, columns 3 and 4).33 The coeﬃcient on the squared consumption-
migrant share interaction suggests a concave relationship between migration and consumption, but
the coeﬃcient estimates are not signiﬁcant after adding household and village controls. Moreover,
the overall eﬀects of migration on household consumption are positive at all consumption levels
observed in the dataset, suggesting that even if we allowed some non-linearity in the observed
eﬀect of migration on consumption, the eﬀect would still be positive for the poor. Perhaps more
troubling, the Cragg-Donald F statistic falls dramatically in these speciﬁcations, indicating that the
larger instrument set is weaker after adding instruments for the second interaction term. Given both
concern over weak instrument bias and only modest evidence that a quadratic relationship might
be important, we continue to use only the interaction between migration and lagged consumption
in further models.
5.4 Out-Migration and Income Per Capita
As t r o n ge ﬀect of out-migration on the consumption of poor households might simply reﬂect a higher
marginal propensity to consume out of additional income for poor households, or alternatively,
may reﬂect a decline in the precautionary saving of poorer households.34 In this case, increases in
consumption with migration from villages may not reﬂect increases in household permanent income.
To test whether incomes are also rising in response to migration, we re-estimate equation (9) using
33To instrument for the second interaction term, we interact the t−3 and t−4 levels of lagged consumption squared
with the eight instruments for the number of village migrants.
34Giles and Yoo (2007) ﬁnd, for example, that a larger migrant network is associated with a decline in precautionary
saving, and that this eﬀect is stronger for households below the poverty line.
23the ﬁrst-diﬀerence of log income per capita as the dependent variable and lagged income per capita
as our proxy for wealth (Table 7).35 The coeﬃcients of interest have the same sign as when we used
consumption as the dependent variable, and the statistical signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients remains.
Increases in out-migration lead to a signiﬁcant increase in income per capita, and that the increase
is also greater among poorer households.
We use the coeﬃcients on migrant share and migrant share interacted with income to show the
predicted eﬀects of increasing village migration on household income per capita across the income
per capita distribution for 1995 (Figure 8). Household income per capita rises faster for poor
households within villages. As with consumption, migration has a statistically signiﬁcant positive
eﬀect on income growth for households below median levels of income per capita in 1995. Finally,
point estimates for the eﬀect of migration on income are somewhat larger than for consumption,
and so it is unlikely that reduced precautionary savings explain the rise in consumption associated
with increasing out-migration.
Our results thus suggest that out-migration from the village is leading to growth in income
and consumption per capita, and that migrant opportunity is contributing to more rapid growth
among poorer households within villages. This result is consistent with Benjamin et al’s (2005)
observation that income from migrant employment was relatively equalizing within villages, and
sheds light on the diﬀerent dimensions of “ability” that may be important for employment in local
versus migrant labor markets. Since it is reasonable to expect that individuals with higher ob-
served ability are capable of beneﬁting from oﬀ-farm opportunities, it is not surprising that early
research on inequality in rural China emphasized that diﬀerential access to local non-agricultural
employment was a signiﬁcant source of increased interpersonal inequality within villages (Rozelle,
1994; Morduch and Sicular, 2000). One might expect that migrant labor markets would also favor
individuals with higher ability and contribute to further increases in inequality within villages.
Declines in within village income inequality with migration raise the possibility that the dimen-
sions of ability important for employment in local and migrant oﬀ-farm employment may diﬀer.
Local employment early in China’s economic reform period was primarily in township and village
enterprises (TVEs) managed by local cadres, and personal or family connections with these cadres
may have been important for securing employment. While migrant employment is also likely se-
35We use the lagged income per capita to facilitate calculation of the long-term eﬀects of a ten percent increase in
the village migrant share. We estimated the eﬀects on income using lagged consumption per capita as our proxy for
wealth (Appendix Table A.3), and found that the direct short-term eﬀects, reﬂected in the estimated coeﬃcients on
the migration and the interaction term are consistent with estimates shown in Table 7.
24cured by referral, friends or relatives making referrals will be under less family pressure to refer
individuals who lack the skills, drive or innate ability to prefer tasks on the job. The equalizing
eﬀect of migrant opportunities on within village inequality raises the possibility that high ability
individuals, lacking the personal connections necessary to secure local employment, use migration
to raise their households income relative to those households with members already employed in
the local non-agricultural labor market.
5.5 Migrant Networks, Investment and Specialization
The results in Tables 5 and 7 combine to show that increases in household per capita consumption
and income are associated with increasing out-migration, and that these eﬀects are stronger among
the poor. However, they do not shed light on the mechanisms by which migration aﬀects con-
sumption or income. First, the migrant labor market may relax credit constraints locally through
remittances, resulting in higher productive investment either in agriculture or non-agricultural self-
employment which contributes to increased earnings. Alternatively, households may not respond
to the relaxation of credit constraints by investing proceeds from migration in housing or consumer
durables. Second, income may increase because migration makes it possible for households to sup-
ply more labor to productive activities, either directly as employees in migrant destinations, or
through local employment as out-migration reduces the local labor supply. Third, households who
have a comparative advantage in agriculture may ﬁnd it easier to expand their land holdings and
earn more income from agriculture.
Understanding these mechanisms may have quite signiﬁcant implications for rural policy in
China. For example, if labor market policies relaxing restrictions on living in urban areas increase
agricultural investment, policy makers charged with designing agricultural policy should take these
increases into account. Alternatively, if loosening labor market restrictions does not aﬀect agri-
cultural investment, agricultural policy makers would need to account for capital requirements
in designing policies aimed at facilitating investments which promise high returns, such as green
houses. To learn about these mechanisms, we next directly examine the relationship between
migration and factors which may drive income generation: investment, labor supply, and land use.
5.5.1 Investment
To observe whether credit constraints are relaxed by migration, we examine whether out-migration
aﬀects either productive investment or investment in housing or durables. We do so using the
25following speciﬁcation:
∆Kit = β1∆cit−1 + β2∆Mjt + β3∆(cit−1 · Mjt)+∆X0
itα + ∆Z0
jtγ + dj + p ⊗ yr+∆ it (11)
where in alternate models ∆Kit is the change in log value of productive assets, the change in
ln(1+value of productive assets related to agriculture), the change in ln(1+value of productive
assets for non-agricultural activities), and the change in log of the imputed value of housing and
durable goods. The coeﬃcient β2 measures how each type of investment changes with the share
of the village labor force employed as migrants, and β3 measures diﬀerences in the eﬀect of the
village migration at diﬀerent points in the initial consumption distribution. Instrument sets and
identiﬁcation strategies in equation (11) are identical to those employed in our consumption models,
regardless of the dependent variable.
We initially estimate the eﬀect of migration on aggregate productive investment (Table 8,
columns 1 through 4). When we estimate the average eﬀect of migration on productive invest-
ment by setting β3 =0 ,w eﬁnd a positive coeﬃcient that is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent
level when we include pre-determined household and village controls. However, when we allow the
eﬀect to vary with initial consumption (columns 3 and 4), the estimated coeﬃcient on the interac-
tion term is positive and has a large standard error, indicating that if anything richer households are
more likely to invest in productive investment than poorer ones with increasing out-migration. This
ﬁnding is at odds with the hypothesis that poorer households are able to alleviate credit constraints
on production through migration. Furthermore, when we predict the eﬀect of migration on invest-
ment across the consumption distribution (Figure 9A), we ﬁnd no indication that migration has a
signiﬁcant impact on productive investment by households at any point in the lagged consumption
distribution, except for those at the very high end of the distribution. Finally, when we examine
investment behavior separately for agricultural and non-agricultural investment (columns 5 through
12), we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀects of migration on either type of productive investment. In sum, the
evidence that migration has a positive eﬀect on productive investment is weak at best. This result
is somewhat at odds with other results found in the literature on migration in China (e.g. Murphy,
1999; Zhao, 2002). As we avoid selection on unobservables and treat the endogeneity of migration
more seriously than previous papers, one might conclude that the suggestive correlations found in
other research on rural-urban migration in China can be explained by other, unobserved factors.
Rural residents remaining behind may well use remittances for investment in housing and
26durable goods, and this eﬀect appears to be evident when we allow for housing and durable goods
investment to vary with initial consumption. In the model that includes a full set of village and
household controls, column (16) of Table 8 and shown in Figure 9B, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant positive
eﬀect of out-migration on investment by households in the lower 25 percent of the consumption dis-
tribution.36 While migration does not appear to lead to additional investment in local productive
activities, at least when we interact village level migration with initial consumption, households
in the lowest quartile of the consumption distribution do seem to invest proceeds from additional
migration in housing and durables, improving their living conditions.
5.5.2 Labor Supply
Increases in the ability to earn income from the migrant labor market may have negative eﬀects
on household labor supply if the wealth eﬀect of higher incomes dominates the substitution eﬀect
of leisure for labor. Households may have initially faced constraints in their ability to supply labor
to the market, and if so, the expansion of migrant opportunity may allow them to increase income
through expanded employment. Direct eﬀects through supply of labor to the migrant labor market
may be complemented by indirect eﬀects through depletion of the local labor force or demand for
labor in the local construction and service sectors.
To investigate this hypothesis, we modify equation (11) and use the change in the logarithm of
labor days supplied (+1) as the dependent variable (Table 9). The results show the same pattern as
the results for consumption and income; as the point estimate for the coeﬃcient on the interaction
term is negative (columns 3 and 4), households with lower levels of initial consumption appear
to supply additional labor to the market when migration is more prevalent. When we graph the
combined eﬀects and calculate standard errors, we ﬁnd that a ten percent increase in the village
migrant share led to a signiﬁcant increase in labor supply for households below median per capita
consumption in 1995 (Figure 10A), and that magnitudes were greater for poorer households. Our
results are consistent with the hypothesis that poorer households are able to raise incomes by
supplying more labor to productive activities as migrant opportunities expand.
36Because migration increases investment in housing and durable goods, one might conclude that it is possible
the whole increase in consumption found in Table 6 can be attributed to the increase in the imputed use value of
housing and durables. When we use non-durables consumption as the dependent variable in equation (9), we ﬁnd
results largely consistent with Table 6, indicating that increased migration leads to both an increase in the imputed
use value of housing and durables and an increase in non-durable consumption (Appendix Table A.4).
275.5.3 Land Use
When rural residents leave for the city, land per capita available in the village will increase. However,
to understand how out-migration aﬀects poorer households within villages, it is important to know
also how migration aﬀects land distribution within villages. During much of the period under
study, China lacked tradeable use rights and secure tenure and it is uncertain who beneﬁtted from
informal land transfers among family members or formal adjustments and reallocations presided
over by village cadres. Benjamin and Brandt (2002), for example, have shown that village leaders
substitute for the market in their reallocation decisions by redistributing land to those who could
u s ei tm o s tp r o d u c t i v e l y .
To examine the impact of migration on the size of land holdings across the wealth distribution,
we use the change in ln(land per capita) as the dependent variable in equation (11) (Table 10;
Figure 10B).37 The results are consistent with the hypothesis that the poorer households increased
the land per capita under their management subsequent to increasing migration; the graphical
representation of the results shows that land per capita increased for the poorest 25 percent of
households in the sample (Figure 10B). Therefore poorer households do indeed beneﬁt as other
households specialize more in non-agricultural activities. While evidence shown in Table 8 suggests
that actual productive investment in agriculture does not increase as a result of migration, poorer
households beneﬁt from increases in farm size with increases in the share of the village labor force
employed in migrant activities.
5.5.4 Summary
Our main results suggest that poorer households increase consumption and income as working age
laborers ﬁnd employment as migrants living and working outside the village. Household incomes
increase as poorer households increase labor supplied to productive activities and beneﬁtf r o m
increases in farm size with out-migration. While we do not ﬁnd robust evidence that households
increase investment in productive activities, poorer households show signiﬁcant increases in their
investment in housing and durable goods.
37For regressions in Table 10 controlling for household characteristics we remove land per capita from the included
control variables.
286C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we demonstrated the positive eﬀect that internal migration in China has had on the
consumption per capita of households remaining in migrant sending communities, and also showed
that these eﬀects are stronger for poorer households within villages. Indeed, increased ease of mi-
gration from villages of rural China is associated with decreasing inequality within communities.38
Increases in out-migration also lead to more pronounced increases in the income of poorer house-
holds, and poorer households supply more labor to productive activities and experience more rapid
income growth.
With respect to the impact of migration on investment in rural areas, we ﬁnd that increases
in migration from rural China are associated with increased accumulation of housing wealth and
consumer durables, but we do not ﬁnd evidence of a signiﬁcant relationship between migration and
investment in productive assets. Evidence that migration might aﬀect investment in agriculture and
promote specialization among poorer households is mixed. While we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant increases
in investments related to agricultural production, poorer households are observed to increase their
land holdings per capita, and thus expand their scale of agricultural production. Contrary to
assertions in the China literature and evidence from the literature on Mexico-US migration, we
do not ﬁnd any indication that rural-urban migration in China is associated with increases in
household investment in non-agricultural production. The lack of a robust impact of migration
on productive investment stands in contrast to recent ﬁndings from the literature examining the
impacts of international ﬂows of labor (Woodruﬀ and Zenteno, 2007; Yang, 2008).
38McKenzie and Rapoport (2006) document a similar eﬀect of international migration on rural communities in
Mexico.
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Figure 1 
Share of Village Labor Force Employed  
as Migrants By Year 
 
 
Figure 1 shows the share of registered village residents who live and work outside the village and 




















Figure 2  
Village Average Consumption Growth and Change in  
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Figure 2 shows the linear and lowess fits of the relationship between annual village average 
consumption growth and annual changes in the share of migrants from the village. Migrants are 
registered residents of the village who live and work outside the village and home county.  




Change in Poverty Headcount as a Function of the Change in the  
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Change in Out-Migrants as a Share of Village Population   
 
Figure 3 shows the linear and lowess fits of the relationship between the annual change in the 
village poverty headcount ratio and the change in share of migrants from the village. Migrants are 
registered residents of the village who live and work outside the village and home county.  
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Figure 4 shows the relationship between change in annual share of migrants from the village and 
number of years since ID cards became available in the county. 






Change in Village Share of Out-Migrants Versus Years-Since-IDs  
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Figure 5 contrasts the relationship between annual change in share of migrants and availability of 
ID cards for counties that were early and late recipients of IDs. 






Change in Share of Village Migrants by Years Since IDs Issued 
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Figure 6 contrasts the relationship between change in migration and availability of ID cards for 
counties that had low (first tercile) versus high (third tercile) variability of rainfall.  
RCRE Village Surveys, 1986-2003, Supplementary Village Governance Survey (2004), monthly 




Effects on Consumption Per Capita of a 10 Percent Increase in Migrant Share  
of Village Population From Different Levels of Initial Consumption 
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Effects on Income Per Capita of a 10 Percent Increase in Migrant Share  
of Village Population at Different Levels of Initial Income 

































5  6 7 8 
Log, Per Capita Income
Point Estimate 95% Confidence Interval 
10 50  25 75  90 
































5  6 7 8 
Log, Per Capita Income
Point Estimate 95% Confidence Interval 






Effects on Investment Per Capita of a 10 Percent Increase in Migrant Share  
of Village Population at Different Levels of Consumption Per Capita 
 (Using 1995 Levels of Consumption Per Capita) 
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Effects on Labor Supply and Household Farm Area of a 10 Percent Increase in Migrant Share  
of Village Population at Different Levels of Consumption Per Capita 
 (Using 1995 Levels of Consumption Per Capita) 
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Local Networks of Rural-Urban Migrants at Time of Migration 
Five-City CULS Migrant Survey* 
     









Share of Migrants with:     
 Job  Arranged  Before  First Migration Experience  0.52  0.57 
 Job  Arranged  Before  Current Migration Experience  0.53  0.56 
  Some Acquaintance from Home Village in City Before Migrating  0.91  0.94 
       **Close Family Member in City Before Migration  0.35  0.35 
       **Extended Family Member in City Before Migration  0.52  0.58 
       **Hometown Acquaintances  0.65  0.67 
       Five or Fewer Hometown Acquaintances  0.39  0.44 
       More than Five Hometown Acquaintances  0.27  0.24 
  At Least One Local Acquaintance 0.09  0.08 
Number of Migrants  2,463  481 
*Respondents are holders of rural registration (hukou).  The survey was conducted in Fuzhou, Shanghai, 
Shenyang, Wuhan and Xian during late 2001.  Sample frames were assembled using information on 
distribution of migrants within cities from the 2000 Population Census.  After selecting neighborhoods through 
a proportional population sampling procedure, sample frames were assembled using residents’ committee 
records of migrant households and registers of migrants living on construction sites and held by local by police 
stations.  Very short-term migrants, who lack a residence that falls under the jurisdiction of either of these 
authorities, are unlikely to have made it into the sample frame. 
**A  close family member is adult sibling or member of nuclear family (e.g., spouse, child, parent).  An 
extended family member refers to cousins or other relatives.  Hometown acquaintances are unrelated, but 
known by the respondent. Note that migrants may have acquaintances in several categories, so that 




Average Village Characteristics in 1988 
by Timing of ID Card Distribution 
              
    Year ID Cards Were Issued 
     
prior to 
1988 in  1988  after  1988 
mean 0.38  0.28  0.27  Share of Productive Assets Owned by  
the Village Collective  std. dev  0.29  0.23  0.26 
 p-value  0.074  0.367  0.118 
 p-value,  loc  0.392  0.560  0.309 
        
Mean Consumption Per Capita  mean  513.6  398.7  413.9 
 std.  dev  209.1  140.9  139.7 
 p-value  0.005  0.057  0.438 
 p-value,  loc  0.060  0.159  0.707 
        
Mean Income Per Capita  mean  724.6  529.0  598.8 
 std.  dev  333.9  207.4  395.1 
 p-value  0.017  0.036  0.895 
 p-value,  loc  0.522  0.206  0.444 
        
Cultivable Share of Total Land Area  mean  0.64  0.518  0.526 
 std.  dev  0.315  0.285  0.278 
 p-value  0.081  0.266  0.567 
 p-value,  loc  0.132  0.613  0.315 
        
Share in Mountains  mean  0.148  0.195  0.318 
 std.  dev  0.362  0.401  0.477 
 p-value  0.344  0.737  0.160 
        
Share Near a City  mean  0.148  0.026  0.045 
 std.  dev  0.362  0.160  0.213 
 p-value  0.048  0.161  0.630 
 p-value,  loc  0.051  0.205  0.545 
        
Average Household Size  mean  3.763  4.113  4.201 
 std.  dev  0.482  0.459  0.602 
 p-value  0.002  0.179  0.077 
 p-value,  loc  0.194  0.979  0.176 
        
Total Village Land  mean  4014  5169  6589 
 std.  dev  4386  5320  7830 
 p-value  0.218  0.999  0.189 
 p-value,  loc  0.877  0.438  0.291 
              
        
Note: We report p-values for t-tests of the hypothesis that the mean is the same as the joint mean of the other 
two categories. P-value, loc reports the p-value of the t-test after partialing out province and terrain (location in 
mountains and hills) fixed effects. 
Table 2 Continued On The Next Page 
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Table 2 (Continued) 
    Year ID Cards Were Issued 
     
prior to 
1988 in  1988  after  1988 
mean 0.007 0.005  0.006  Village Cadres Share of Village Population 
std. dev  0.006  0.003  0.006 
 p-value  0.233  0.419  0.734 
  p-value, loc  0.819 0.477  0.567 
mean 0.679 0.840  0.823  Share of Households Primarily in Agriculture 
std. dev  0.324  0.240  0.300 
 p-value  0.019  0.121  0.494 
  p-value, loc  0.585 0.643  0.961 
Village Population  mean  1359  1330  1511 
 std.  dev  870  597  918 
 p-value  0.839  0.557  0.372 
 p-value,  loc  0.479  0.454  0.916 
Village Consumption Per Capita Gini  mean  0.176  0.161  0.162 
 std.  dev  0.033  0.025  0.031 
 p-value  0.030  0.173  0.469 
 p-value,  loc  0.239  0.311  0.928 
Village Income Per Capita Gini  mean  0.231  0.227  0.223 
 std.  dev  0.067  0.050  0.073 
 p-value  0.734  0.985  0.733 
 p-value,  loc  0.250  0.444  0.733 
Village Cultivable Land Per Capita Gini  mean  0.226  0.161  0.197 
 std.  dev  0.109  0.059  0.094 
 p-value  0.011  0.006  0.690 
 p-value,  loc  0.302  0.047  0.244 
mean 0.070 0.091  0.041  Village Poverty Headcount, Using Official poverty 
line std.  dev  0.201  0.155  0.080 
 p-value  0.936  0.319  0.290 
 p-value,  loc  0.940  0.741  0.646 
mean 0.174 0.325  0.235  Village Poverty Headcount, Using Chen-Ravallion 
Poverty Line  std. dev  0.279  0.333  0.255 
 p-value  0.091  0.057  0.711 
 p-value,  loc  0.195  0.101  0.622 
mean 0.379 0.376  0.355  Share of Households in Largest Patrilineal Clan 
std. dev  0.260  0.315  0.282 
 p-value  0.879  0.902  0.762 
 p-value,  loc  0.821  0.971  0.843 
Observations   27  39  22 
              
Note: P-values test the hypothesis that the mean is the same as the joint mean of the other categories; P-Value 




Developing the First-Stage: Timing of ID Card Distribution and Change in Share of Migrants in Village Population 
                              (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
(Years Since IDs Issued)t-2  -0.023 -0.008 0.087 -0.004 -0.026 0.031 0.042 0.041 
  (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
[(Years Since IDs Issued)t-2]
2/10  0.011 -0.016 -0.335 -0.003 0.051 -0.117 -0.149 -0.146 
  (0.001) (0.006) (0.018) (0.002) (0.008) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
[(Years Since IDs Issued)t-2]
3/100    0.013 0.360    -0.028 0.140 0.171 0.169 
    (0.003) (0.018)    (0.004) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) 
[(Years Since IDs Issued)t-2]
4/1000     -0.119    -0.054  -0.063  -0.063 
     (0.006)    (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010) 
      -0.655 1.138 2.674 2.480 2.584  (Variance of Rainfall) * (Years Since IDs 
Issued)t-2        (0.054) (0.124) (0.234) (0.235) (0.239) 
      -0.496 -3.328 -9.473 -8.942 -9.244  (Variance of Rainfall) * [(Years Since IDs 
Issued)t-2]
2/10        (0.046) (0.239) (0.803) (0.804) (0.815) 
        1.947 9.327 8.847 9.123  (Variance of Rainfall) * [(Years Since IDs 
Issued)t-2]
3/100          (0.117) (0.892) (0.893) (0.904) 
      -2.728  -2.576  -2.656  (Variance of Rainfall) * [(Years Since IDs 
Issued)t-2]
4/1000        (0.315)  (0.315)  (0.319) 
Two Period Lag Village Contols Included?  No  No  No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Two Period Lag Household Controls Included?  No  No  No  No  No  No  No  Yes 
Number of Obs.  53106 53106 53106 53106 53106 53106 53019 52174 
R
2  0.006 0.008 0.016 0.013  0.02  0.039 0.045 0.046 
F statistic  41.501 40.059 61.141 49.609 57.102 83.684 81.389 71.306 
Partial R
2,,  Instruments  0.0038 0.0046 0.0119 0.0048 0.0079 0.0124 0.0130 0.0137 
Notes: (1) All models include jointly significant controls for village and province*year effects, as well as other included instruments. (2) Dependent variable 
is change in number of the migrants from the village between year t-1 and t divided by 100. (3) Robust standard errors are cluster corrected at the village, and 
there are 90 village clusters. (4) Two-period lag village controls include: total number of working age laborers in registered village labor force, total village 
land, share of land in village in orchards, share of total assets owned by the village collective. (5) Two-period lag household controls include: number of 
working age laborers in the household, male working age laborer share of household population, female working age laborer share of household population, 
household land per capita, value of household productive assets, average years of education of working age laborers. 
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Table 4 
Are the “Years-Since IDs” Instruments Correlated with  
Changes in Time-Varying Village Policies? 
F-Statistics on Instruments (p-values in parentheses) 






(Years Since ID 








0.72 0.35  Share of Grain Sold at Quota Price  
(Calculated by value)  (0.67)  (0.941) 
    
1.59 1.63  Share of Households Renting-in Land 
 (0.14)  (0.127) 
    
Share of Households Renting-out Land   1.72  1.43 
 (0.104)  (0.195) 
    
1.17 1.61  Average Village Per Capita Tax Rates Paid by 
Households (0.327)  (0.133) 
    
0.68 0.77  Logarithm, Value of Assets Managed by the 
Village Collective  (0.704)  (0.629) 
    
Notes: Each policy variable listed is the dependent variable in regression models and we report 
the F-statistic for the hypothesis that the coefficients on the instruments are jointly equal to zero. 
The instruments are the quartic in years since ID cards were issued, and interactions of the 
quartic with the village variance of rainfall. The number in parentheses is the p-value for the F-
statistic. All regressions used the policy variable in as the dependent variable, and all variables in 
all regressions are differenced to control for household fixed effects. All regressions also 
included village and province-year dummies to account for village specific trends and province 
level macroeconomic shocks. Village controls lagged two periods include the total number of 
working age laborers in the registered village labor force; total village land area; the share of 
village land in orchards; and the share of total assets owned by the village collective. Twice 
lagged household controls include the number of working age laborers in the household; the 
share of the household that is male and of working age; the share that is female and of working 
age; household land per capita; and the average years of education among adults.  All regressions 





Migration and Household Consumption in Migrant-Sending Villages 
(All Models in First Differences) 
  Dependent Variable: ln(Household Consumption Per Capita)
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
0.596 0.506 0.540 0.614  0.53  0.568  ln(Household Consumption Per Capita)t-1 
(0.036) (0.036) (0.054) (0.030) (0.030) (0.036) 
    -0.729  -0.313  -1.17  ln(HH Consumption Per Capita)t-1 * (Share of 
Migrants in Village Population)        (0.345) (0.356) (0.414) 
Share of Migrants in Village Population  1.736 1.407 1.170 5.102 2.262 7.156 
  (0.904) (0.836) (0.901) (2.067) (2.142) (2.456) 
Village Level Control Variables       
Village Labor Force   0.001  0.037  0.001  0.036 
   (0.004)  (0.018)  (0.003)  (0.015) 
 0.292  0.551  0.132  0.271  Cultivable Share of Village Land 
 (0.116)  (0.403)  (0.074)  (0.284) 
Total Village Land   0.018  0.045  0.008  0.012 
   (0.010)  (0.026)  (0.007)  (0.029) 
 -0.054  -0.426  -0.046  -0.181  Share of Assets Owned by Village Collective 
 (0.032)  (0.220)  (0.026)  (0.112) 
 0.121  -0.486  0.236  0.066  Share of Village Land in Orchards 
 (0.170)  (0.989)  (0.099)  (0.500) 
Household Level Control Variables       
 0.553  0.302  0.555  0.336  Working-Age Male Share of Household 
Population   (0.028)  (0.122)  (0.025)  (0.093) 
 0.546  -0.054  0.542  0.057  Working-Age Female Share of Household 
Population   (0.029)  (0.167)  (0.023)  (0.130) 
 -0.106  <0.001  -0.106  -0.008  Number of Working Age Laborers in the 
Household   (0.007)  (0.020)  (0.006)  (0.015) 
 0.062  0.007  0.064  0.008  Cultivable Land Per Capita 
 (0.007)  (0.018)  (0.006)  (0.013) 
 -0.002  -0.013  -0.002  -0.014  Household Average Years of Education 
 (0.002)  (0.005)  (0.002)  (0.005) 
Village, HH Controls Predetermined?  No Yes    No Yes 
Regression Statistics        
Hansen J Statistic  9.66  10.57 10.65 21.77 22.08  30.8 
P-value, J statistic  0.29  0.227 0.223 0.534 0.516 0.128 
Shea partial R
2, migration  0.0106 0.0106 0.0091 0.0216 0.0207 0.0213 
Cragg-Donald F-Statistic  53.099 52.108 14.907 23.774  24.01  9.942 
Number of Clusters  88 88 88 88 88 88 
Number of Observations  53106 51826 51608 53106 51826 51608 
Notes: All models are run in first-differences and include jointly significant village fixed effects to control for village 
specific trends, and province-year effects to control for province-wide macroeconomic shocks.  Standard errors 
clustered at the village level.  Lagged consumption, the interaction between consumption and migration, and migration 




Migration and Household Consumption, Alternative Relationships 
  Dependent Variable: ln(Household Consumption Per Capita)
              
0.209 -0.289 -0.273  -0.279   ln(Household Consumption Per Capita)t-1 
(0.345) (0.359) (0.294)  (0.545) 
0.033 0.072  0.07  0.065   (ln(HH Consumption Per Capita)t-1)
2 
(0.028) (0.030) (0.024)  (0.045) 
-0.792 -1.131  7.204  2.113   ln(HH Consumption Per Capita)t-1 * (Share of Migrants 
in Village Population)  (0.339) (0.384) (2.202)  (5.115) 
   -0.612  -0.221   (ln(HH Consumption Per Capita)t-1 )
2* (Share of 
Migrants in Village Population)     (0.171)  (0.409) 
Share of Migrants in Village Population  5.659  7.222  -19.891  -4.161 
 (2.040)  (2.281)  (6.886)  (15.673) 
Village Level Control Variables       
Village Labor Force    0.031    0.029 
   (0.014)    (0.008) 
 0.348   0.199  Cultivable Share of Village Land 
 (0.263)   (0.218) 
Total Village Land    0.033    0.025 
   (0.025)    (0.019) 
 -0.094   -0.072  Share of Assets Owned by Village Collective 
 (0.099)   (0.072) 
 0.229   -0.002  Share of Village Land in Orchards 
 (0.433)   (0.347) 
Household Level Control Variables       
 0.294   0.377  Working-Age Male Share of Household Population 
 (0.096)   (0.133) 
 -0.046   0.018  Working-Age Female Share of Household Population 
 (0.139)   (0.162) 
 <0.001   -0.007  Number of Working Age Laborers in the Household 
 (0.016)   (0.022) 
 0.005   0.026  Cultivable Land Per Capita 
 (0.013)   (0.026) 
 -0.012   -0.016  Household Average Years of Education 
 (0.005)   (0.007) 
Village, HH Controls Predetermined?    yes    yes 
Regression Statistics       
Hansen J Statistic  22.388  28.715  32.519  105.276 
P-value, J statistic  0.556  0.231  0.759  0 
Shea partial R
2, migration  0.0217  0.0215  0.0245  0.0204 
Cragg-Donald F-Statistic  21.318  8.761  15.608  7.264 
Number of Clusters  88  88  88  88 
Number of Observations  53106  51608  53106  51608 
Notes: All models are run in first-differences and include jointly significant village fixed effects to control for village 
specific trends, and province-year effects to control for province-wide macroeconomic shocks.  Standard errors 
clustered at the village level in columns 1-3 and are treated as robust in column 4 (cluster robust standard errors could 
not be estimated). The lagged consumption, the interaction between consumption and migration, and migration are 




Migration and Household Income Per Capita 
(All Models in First Differences) 
  Dependent Variable: ln(Household Income Per Capita) 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
0.483 0.420 0.427 0.508 0.466 0.529  Ln(Household Income Per Capita)t-
1  (0.056) (0.055) (0.070) (0.040) (0.041) (0.045) 
    -0.980  -0.778  -1.424  Ln(HH Income Per Capita)t-1 * 
(Share of Migrants in Village 
Population)      (0.362)  (0.358)  (0.453) 
2.300 2.128 1.816 7.117 5.498 9.323  Share of Migrants in Village 
Population  (1.156) (1.158) (1.305) (2.265) (2.298) (2.835) 
Village Level Control Variables        
Village Labor Force   0.013  0.006  0.017  0.011 
   (0.005)  (0.019)  (0.004)  (0.014) 
 0.137  1.245  0.025  1.253  Cultivable Share of Village Land 
 (0.198)  (0.810)  (0.180)  (0.585) 
Total Village Land   -0.011  0.007  -0.023  0.05 
   (0.018)  (0.060)  (0.014)  (0.045) 
 -0.033  -0.452  -0.023  -0.117  Share of Assets Owned by Village 
Collective   (0.040)  (0.283)  (0.035)  (0.111) 
 -0.374  -2.189  -0.218  -1.088  Share of Village Land in Orchards 
 (0.157)  (1.358)  (0.120)  (0.835) 
Household Level Control Variables       
 0.546  0.734  0.508  0.797  Working-Age Male Share of 
Household Population    (0.037) (0.150)    (0.032) (0.108) 
  0.442  0.668  0.421  0.611  Working-Age Female Share of 
Household Population    (0.037) (0.192)    (0.033) (0.127) 
  -0.032 -0.078    -0.031 -0.082  Number of Working Age Laborers 
in the Household    (0.008) (0.019)    (0.006) (0.015) 
  0.097 -0.061    0.102 -0.073  Cultivable Land Per Capita 
  (0.011) (0.035)    (0.009) (0.031) 
  0.009 -0.016    0.010 -0.022  Household Average Years of 
Education    (0.003) (0.006)    (0.002) (0.006) 
Village, HH Controls 
Predetermined? 
 No  Yes  No  Yes 
Regression Statistics        
Hansen J Statistic  8.28  9.483  10.7  24.353 25.633 25.064 
P-value, J statistic  0.406 0.303 0.219 0.384 0.318 0.347 
Shea Partial R
2, Migrant Share  0.0105 0.0103  0.009  0.0146 0.0147 0.0142 
Cragg-Donald F-Statistic  42.7  41.578 13.706 18.802 19.708  9.022 
Number  of  Clusters  88 88 88 88 88 88 
Number of Observations  52626 51358 51141 52626 51358 51141 
Notes: All models are run in first-differences and include jointly significant village fixed effects to control for village 
specific trends, and province-year effects to control for province-wide macroeconomic shocks.  Standard errors 
clustered at the village level.  Lagged income, the interaction between income and migration, and migration are treated 
as endogenous.   
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Table 8 
Migration and Household Investment Behavior 
(All Models Estimated in First Differences Using IV-GMM) 
Panel A                         
Dependent Variable:  ln(Productive Assets Per Capita)  ln(Agricultural Assets Per Capita+1) 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
0.248 0.079 0.336 0.241 0.224 0.092 0.440 0.362  ln(Household Consumption Per Capita)t-1 
(0.098) (0.114) (0.070) (0.074) (0.103) (0.129) (0.069) (0.077) 
   0.699  0.228    -0.105  -0.206  ln(HH Consumption Per Capita)t-1 * (Share of Migrants in 
Vill. Population)     (0.609)  (0.655)     (0.709)  (0.723) 
Share of Migrants in Village Population  4.090  3.876 -3.400 -1.737 1.790 1.704 1.685 1.326 
  (2.224) (1.874) (4.071) (3.977) (2.020) (1.957) (4.492) (4.475) 
Household,  Village  Controls?  no Yes no yes no yes no yes 
Cragg  Donald  F  Statistic  53.099 14.907 23.774  9.942  53.099 14.907 23.774  9.942 
P-value,  Hansen  J-Statistic  0.051 0.142 0.126 0.128 0.046 0.216 0.124 0.219 
Number  of  Observations  53106 51608 53106 51608 53106 51608 53106 51608 
          
Panel B                         
  ln(Non-Ag Assets Per Capita+1)  ln(Durables+Housing Per Capita) 
    (9)  (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
0.206 0.013 0.200 0.014 0.488 0.452 0.507 0.529  ln(Household Consumption Per Capita)t-1 
(0.092) (0.112) (0.083) (0.083) (0.057) (0.063) (0.050) (0.051) 
    1.915  1.677                        -1.086  -1.516  ln(HH Consumption Per Capita)t-1 * (Share of Migrants in 
Vill. Population)      (1.162)  (0.936)                        (0.364)  (0.398) 
Share of Migrants in Village Population  5.212  3.596 -11.257 -11.481  1.968 1.183 8.055 9.562 
  (2.929) (2.286) (6.990) (5.764) (0.935) (0.920) (2.446) (2.532) 
Household,  Village  Controls?  no Yes no yes no yes no yes 
Cragg  Donald  F  Statistic  53.099 14.907 23.774  9.942  53.213 14.964  15.55  9.963 
P-value,  Hansen  J-Statistic  0.148 0.183 0.106 0.066  0.58  0.493 0.342 0.278 
Number  of  Observations  53106 51608 53106 51608 53073 51585 53073 51585 
Notes: Each model is estimated in first-differences. Models including household and village level controls use the full set of controls shown in Table 5, treat them as 
predetermined and instrument them with t-2 lag levels. All models include jointly significant village fixed effects to control for village specific trends, and province-year 





Migration and Household Labor Supply 
(All Models Estimated in First Differences Using IV-GMM) 
              
  Log(Total Labor Days Per Capita+1) 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
0.111 0.137 0.132 0.157  ln(Household Consumption Per Capita)t-1 
(0.070) (0.074) (0.052) (0.055) 
      
   -1.471  -0.586  ln(HH Consumption Per Capita)t-1 * (Share of 
Migrants in Vill. Population)     (0.414)  (0.417) 
      
Share of Migrants in Village Population  1.468  2.088  9.713  3.925 
  (1.125) (1.169) (2.622) (2.677) 
      
Household,  Village  Controls?  no yes no yes 
Cragg Donald F Statistic  53.099  14.907  23.774  9.942 
P-value,  Hansen  J-Statistic  0.179 0.655 0.094 0.472 
Number  of  Observations  53106 51598 53106 51598 
Each model is estimated in first-differences. Models including household and village level controls use 
the full set of controls shown in Table 5, treat them as predetermined and instrument them with t-2 lag 
levels. All models include jointly significant village fixed effects to control for village specific trends, 
and province-year effects to control for province-wide macroeconomic shocks.  We show cluster 





Migration and Land Per Capita  
(all models in first differences) 
  Dependent Variable: Logarithm, Land per Capita 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
0.217 0.178 0.173 0.129  ln(Household Consumption Per Capita)t-1 
(0.030) 0.035 (0.025) 0.028 
      
   -0.827  -0.852  ln(HH Consumption Per Capita)t-1 * (Share of Migrants in 
Village Population)     (0.429)  0.381 
      
Share of Migrants in Village Population  1.054  0.844  5.326  5.559 
  (0.588) (0.702) (2.515) (2.200) 
        
Village and Household Controls Predetermined?  no  yes  no  Yes 
       
Regression Statistics      
Hansen J Statistic  6.272  4.32  29.4  20.796 
P-value, J statistic  0.617  0.827  0.167  0.594 
Shea partial R
2,  migration  0.012 0.011 0.015 0.015 
Cragg-Donald F-Statistic  55.301  15.72  17.355  9.335 
Number  of  Clusters  88 88 88 88 
Number of Observations  49464  48595  49464  48595 
Each model is estimated in first-differences. Models including household and village level controls use the full set of 
controls shown in Table 5, treat them as predetermined and instrument them with t-2 lag levels. All models include 
jointly significant village fixed effects to control for village specific trends, and province-year effects to control for 
province-wide macroeconomic shocks.  We show cluster corrected standard errors for 88 village clusters. Models are 





Appendix Table A.1 
Logit Hazard Model for Distribution of ID cards 
  Dependent Variable: 1 when card is issued; 0 otherwise 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Coefficient Marginal Coefficient Marginal Coefficient Marginal 
-3.338 -0.033      -3.254 -0.032  Squared Rainfall Shock 
in Year t-1  (2.610)  (0.026)    (2.571)  (0.025) 
        
    -3.460 -0.034 -3.375 -0.030  Squared Rainfall Shock, 
in Year t-2      (3.993) (0.039) (3.912) (0.039) 
           
Number of Obs.  509 509 509 
Log Likelihood  -148.3 -148.3 -147.8 
Chi-Square Statistic       2.72 
p-value, est. coeffs. are 
jointly zero 
     0.26 
Notes: We alternatively use the squared rainfall shock in year t-1 and year t-2, and combine them in model (3). 
Provincial dummies and year dummies included in all equations.  Hypothesis tests are chi-squared tests for the null 







Household Consumption and Village Migration: OLS Models 
Dependent Variable: Ln(Household Consumption Per Capita) 
              
  OLS, Levels  OLS, Differences 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
0.614 0.618  -0.338  -0.305  ln(Household Consumption Per Capita)t-1 
(0.011) (0.014)  (0.008) (0.010) 
        
 -0.055   -0.465  ln(HH Consumption Per Capita)t-1 * 
(Migrant Share)   (0.136)   (0.103) 
        
Migrant Share of Village Population  -0.007  0.322  -0.081  2.706 
 (0.108)  (0.879)  (0.135)  (0.638) 
        
Number of Obs.  53106  53106  53106  53106 
              
Notes: All models include village and province-year fixed effects.  Standard errors clustered at the 




Migration and Household Income with Lagged Consumption as a Proxy for Wealth 
(All Models in First Differences) 
                    
  Dependent Variable: ln(Household Income Per Capita) 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
0.356 0.301 0.314 0.349 0.285 0.296  ln(Household Consumption Per Capita)t-1 
(0.057) (0.055) (0.072) (0.049) (0.051) (0.060) 
    -0.675  -0.466  -0.996  ln(HH Consumption Per Capita)t-1 * (Share 
of Migrants in Village Population)      (0.466)  (0.507)  (0.489) 
Share  of  Migrants  in  Village  Population  2.544 2.508 2.031 6.130 4.280 7.118 
  (1.291) (1.274) (1.282) (2.801) (3.007) (2.965) 
        
Village Level Control Variables        
Village  Labor  Force   0.013  0.024  0.014  0.022 
   (0.005)  (0.017)  (0.003)  (0.012) 
 0.214  1.238  0.159  0.604  Cultivable Share of Village Land 
 (0.154)  (0.800)  (0.133)  (0.424) 
Total  Village  Land   -0.013  -0.029  -0.010  -0.020 
   (0.015)  (0.058)  (0.011)  (0.033) 
 -0.014  -0.422  -0.015  -0.180  Share of Assets Owned by Village 
Collective   (0.034)  (0.250)  (0.029)  (0.134) 
 -0.35  -1.678    -0.234  -0.808  Share of Village Land in Orchards 
 (0.160)  (1.173)  (0.105)  (0.608) 
        
Household Level Control Variables        
 0.538  0.893  0.514  0.982  Working-Age Male Share of Household 
Population   (0.035)  (0.169)  (0.029)  (0.136) 
 0.439  0.651  0.424  0.737  Working-Age Female Share of Household 
Population   (0.033)  (0.235)  (0.027)  (0.175) 
 -0.030  -0.045  -0.028  -0.056  Number of Working Age Laborers in the 
Household   (0.007)  (0.026)  (0.006)  (0.021) 
 0.097  0.001  0.093  -0.014  Cultivable Land Per Capita 
 (0.010)  (0.031)  (0.008)  (0.026) 
 0.008  -0.010  0.010  -0.015  Household Average Years of Education 
 (0.002)  (0.006)  (0.002)  (0.005) 
Village, HH Controls Predetermined?    No  Yes    No  Yes 
Regression Statistics        
Hansen  J  Statistic  7.812 9.232 9.986 20.36  23.838  23.515 
P-value,  J  statistic  0.452 0.323 0.266  0.62  0.413 0.431 
Shea partial R
2,  migration  0.0105 0.0105  0.009  0.0217 0.0208 0.0219 
Cragg-Donald  F-Statistic  52.612 51.655 15.079 23.655 23.909  9.859 
Number  of  Clusters  88 88 88 88 88 88 
Number  of  Observations  52881 51610 51393 52881 51610 51393 
Notes: All models are run in first-differences and include jointly significant village fixed effects to control for village 
specific trends, and province-year effects to control for province-wide macroeconomic shocks.  Standard errors clustered at 
the village level.  Lagged consumption, the interaction between consumption and migration, and migration are treated as 
endogenous.   






Migration and Household Non-Durable Consumption Per Capita 
(All Models in First Differences) 
              
  Dependent Variable: ln(Household Income Per Capita)
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
0.600 0.550 0.619 0.583  ln(Household Consumption Per Capita)t-1 
(0.039) (0.058) (0.030) (0.041) 
       
                      -0.508  -1.033  ln(HH Income Per Capita)t-1 * (Share of 
Migrants in Village Population)                        (0.358)  (0.437) 
      
1.412 1.05 3.556  6.069 
Share of Migrants in Village Population  (0.881) (0.878) (2.144) (2.605) 
      
      
Regression Statistics      
Hansen J Statistic  8.043  10.094  18.316  29.49 
P-value, J statistic  0.429  0.258  0.74  0.165 
Cragg-Donald  F-Statistic  53.052 14.922 23.468  9.853 
Number  of  Clusters  88 88 88 88 
Number  of  Observations  52626 51141 52626 51141 
Notes: Notes: Each model is estimated in first-differences. Models including household and village 
level controls use the full set of controls shown in Table 5, treat them as predetermined and 
instrument them with t-2 lag levels. All models include jointly significant village fixed effects to 
control for village specific trends, and province-year effects to control for province-wide 
macroeconomic shocks.  We show cluster corrected standard errors for 88 village clusters. Models 
are estimated using IV-GMM..   
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